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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
1938, wire tapping was allowed with controls.4' That state's
Code of Criminal Procedure42 provides for the issuance of
ex parte orders by various judges, upon the oath or affirma-
tion of a district attorney, attorney general, or a police
officer above the rank of sergeant, of the need to intercept
telephone or telegraphic communications. There must be
reasonable ground to believe the evidence of crime may be
obtained thereby; the particular telephone line or other
means of communication must be identified, and the person
whose communications are to be intercepted must be de-
scribed. Through these means the indiscriminate use of
wire tapping with all its inherent dangers is limited. That
such dangers are to be found can be seen from the fact that
a United States Committee on Interstate Commerce recom-
mended an investigation of wire tapping because of its
dangerous propensities.4 3
A law similar to that of New York was considered by the
Maryland Legislative Council, as an outgrowth of a pro-
posal to ban wire-tapping completely. The Council recom-
mended to the 1953 Legislature a bill permitting wire-
tapping pursuant to Court order and permitting the intro-
duction of evidence thus obtained,4 but the bill failed
of adoption.
VALIDITY OF A REZONING ORDINANCE
IN MARYLAND
Kracke v. Weinberg'
A bill of complaint for a declaratory decree was filed
by the appellees, husband and wife, against the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore for the purpose of having a rezon-
ing ordinance 2 declared invalid as applied to the property
of the plaintiffs. The realty in question consisted of approxi-
mately 3 acres of unimproved land, traversed by streams
"N. Y. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 12:
"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable intercep-
tion of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated,
and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirma-
tion that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime
may be thus obtained, .... 9
2 Section 813a.
" Sen. Rep. No. 1304, 76th Congress, 3rd Session.
"Maryland Legislative Council, Report to The General Assembly of 1953,
Vol. 1, p. 32.
'79 A. 2d 387 (1951).
2 Ordinance No. 510, Approved July 10, 1946.
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and bounded on the northeast by a "paper" street which
was between it and the Pennsylvania railroad. Originally
in March of 1931, Ordinance No. 1247 was passed, zoning this
property as 2d Commercial. It remained so until July, 1946,
when Ordinance No. 510 was passed, rezoning to residential
the general area in which plaintiff's property was located.
The bill contended that plaintiffs' land had no value for, and
was totally unsuited for, residential purposes and that the
ordinance amounted to a taking of plaintiffs' land without
due process. The Chancellor ruled that the Ordinance was
void and invalid insofar as it pertained to the appellee's
property because it amounted to a taking without due com-
pensation. It was from this ruling that an appeal was taken.
From the facts of the case as presented to the Court of
Appeals, it appeared that to use the land in question for
residential purposes, a street would have to be built, a
foundation could not be easily found for the houses, the
stream would have to be taken care of with heavy pipes,
and any residential builder would run into such prohibitive
costs that he would go bankrupt. It also appeared that the
ordinance was passed as a result of a demand on the part
of residents of Wilhelm Park that they should be protected
by preventing the construction of any commercial and in-
dustrial developments on the land between them and the
railroad and Wilkens Avenue.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court and in
doing so stated:
"Where property is rezoned, it must appear that
either there was some mistake in the original zoning,
or that the character of the neighborhood has changed
to such an extent that such action ought to be taken.
Neither situation is present in the case before us. The
property has always been commercial and apparently
there is little chance of its ever being used for residence
purposes. Rezoning to residential results in preventing
the owners from using it, not only for its most suitable
use, but for any practical use at all. Under these cir-
cumstances, their property is being taken from them
without compensation, and we think the ordinance was
void as to it."
In order to properly appreciate the import of the con-
stitutionality of a rezoning ordinance, it would be advan-
tageous to briefly scan the development of the zoning laws
SSupra, n. 1, 391.
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in Maryland from a constitutional aspect. The early history
of the validity of municipal zoning ordinances was rather
sketchy and undependable, since the courts looked for some
expression of the people's will either from an act of the
state legislature or from an article in the state constitution
before legalizing any zoning ordinance.4 Most of the courts,
Maryland's included, were reluctant to uphold any zoning
ordinance without the adoption of a State Enabling Act by
the legislature.5 In the period from 1916 to 1928 some cities,
including Baltimore, felt that their home rule charters were
sufficiently broad to cover the enactment of zoning regula-
tions without further authority from the state. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals, however, did not fall in line with this
theory and considered them unreasonable6 and too liberal
an application of the police powers of the state.
Much valuable time was lost by these futile attempts
to adopt zoning ordinances without an enabling act.7 Then
Maryland's first Enabling Act was passed,' and the initial
conflict with the courts (i.e., the problem of municipal
power to enact zoning laws) was overcome. The only
question remaining was the extent to which the police
power of the state would be used by way of building restric-
tions, etc., through the zoning ordinances. When the
majority of states, including Maryland, had adopted such
legislation,9 it became apparent that the major problems
were the requirements of the "Due Process" and "Equal
Protection" clauses of the 14th Amendment to the Consti-
tution. Any hesitancy the Courts may have had in approv-
ing the constitutionality of restricted residential use dis-
tricts, however, was overcome when the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the United States Court of
Appeals in the Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Com-
pany1° case and held that under the police powers specific
residential use districts excluding any and all industrial
' BAssmv, ZONING (1940), p. 13.
5 Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925).
6 Applestein v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 156 Md. 40, 143 A. 666 (1928);
Bauernschmidt v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Md. 647, 139 A. 531 (1927) ; State
v. Rutherford, 145 Md. 363, 125 A. 725 (1922).
BASSErT, supra, n. 4, pp. 14-17, "Home Rule Charters".
8 Md. Laws 1927, Chapter 705, Md. Code 1951, Art. 66B, Secs. 1-9. See
also: Md. Code, Art. 66B, Secs. 21-37.
1 Sec. 3 of the Zoning Enabling Act, ibid., provides, inter alia, with refer-
ence to zoning regulations:
"Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and ... with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the
character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses,
and with a view to conserving the value of Buildings and encouraging
the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality."
'272 U. S. 365, 54 A. L. R. 1016 (1926).
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buildings were valid. Justice Sutherland in that case lays
down the very broad principles governing the constitution-
ality of zoning ordinances which have served as a guide to
the courts since. This case was the foundation stone of the
majority rule today that in passing upon the constitution-
ality of a zoning ordinance, enacted as a police measure,
the court will not substitute its opinion for that of the
legislative body, which is charged with the responsibility
of determining the question, where the question is fairly
debatable, unless the ordinance is clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, morals, or public welfare." The power of a munici-
pal or county governing body to zone is not unlimited,"2
however, and in Nectow v. Cambridge," the Supreme
Court held that particular use classifications may be set
aside, where it is shown "that the health, safety, conveni-
ence and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of
the city affected will not be promoted by the disposition
made by the ordinance of the locus in question"."
The Maryland Court of Appeals in the recent case of
Cassel v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,5 further
outlined the constitutional restrictions beyond which the
Courts would not allow zoning ordinances to go. Judge
Delaplaine, in his opinion, delivered a devastating barrage
on the practice of the so-called "spot zoning"'6 ordinances
(which various city councils have passed for the benefit of
a particular special interest), which also throws some light
on the same problems as applied to rezoning.
"We now come to the specific question whether the
City Council can discriminate in favor of a mortician
by permitting him to conduct a funeral home in a
U See also 54 A. L. R. 1032; Anne Arundel County v. Ward, 186 Md. 330,
46 A. 2d 684 (1946) ; Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 47 A. 2d 613 (1946).
12 See M. & C. C. of Baltimore v. Byrd, 62 A. 2d 588 (Md., 1948). See also
an interesting annotation in 117 A. L. R. 1123 stating:
"The basis of the power to limit the use of real estate to conform
to a zoning ordinance is the police power, and the validity of zoning
ordinances as a means of promoting the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community is too well established to warrant
discussion. Where, however, the zoning regulations bear no substantial
relationship to health, safety, morals, or general welfare, but impose
restrictions on the use of private property that are unnecessary and
unreasonable, they violate the 14th Amendment and are invalid."
277 U. S. 183 (1928).
I Ibid, 188. See also Hoffman v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 79 A. 2d 367, 373
(Md., 1951), citing the Nectow case.
73 A. 2d 486 (Md., 1950).
18 "Arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a small area within a zon-
ing district to a use which is inconsistent with the use to which the rest
of the district is restricted." Ibid, 488-9.
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locality which has long been zoned as residential. The
rule adopted in other States, which we follow, is that
an amendment to a municipal zoning ordinance that
creates a separate commercial district of a single lot
of ground to enable an individual to obtain a permit
to use his residence on the lot as a funeral home is
ordinarily invalid because it provides for unreasonable
and discriminatory 'spot zoning' beyond the statutory
power of the city."' 7
The Court further states:
"The State Zoning Enabling Act demands that all
zoning regulations shall be uniform for each class or
kind of buildings throughout each district, but the
zoning regulations in one district may differ from those
in other districts. Code 1939, Art. 66B, Secs. 2, 21. The
regulations for the use of property within the various
use districts are supported upon the basic theory that
they apply equally and uniformly within the district
affected. Invidious distinctions and discriminations in
zoning cannot be allowed, for the very essence of zoning
is territorial division according to the character of the
land and the buildings, their peculiar suitability for
particular uses, and uniformity of use within the use
district."'"
The State Zoning Enabling Act provides in Article 66B,
Sec. 21 (d) : " "The council shall provide for the manner in
which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries
of such districts shall be determined, established and en-
forced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or
changed." In Sec. 5 it states: "Such regulations, restric-
tions, and boundaries may from time to time be amended,
supplemented, changed, modified, or repealed." From these
two sections of the Code and the various statutes pertaining
to particular localities are derived the powers of the various
municipal governing bodies (i.e., city councils) and county
governing bodies (i.e., county commissioners) to rezone
the various districts within their jurisdictions. Thus the
General Assembly of Maryland has gone one step further
then mere general zoning authorization, by passing legis-
lation specifically authorizing the various municipalities
and local governments to set up planning commissions to
-7 Ibid, 489.




help their zoning plans keep abreast of the times and
various population shifts which are becoming increasingly
important in cities today.
In taking up the broad question of the validity or in-
validity of a rezoning ordinance as opposed to an original
zoning ordinance, the "Due Process" clause of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution is a broader protection to
the property holder and a greater obstacle to the validity
of an "arbitrary rezoning ordinance". In the leading case of
Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher," decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1938 and used as a guide in
the Maryland Court of Appeals, Judge Lehman, in holding
invalid a New York City ordinance which changed unde-
veloped property from an unrestricted zone to a restricted
residential zone stated:
"We have already pointed out that in the case which
we are reviewing, the plaintiff's land cannot at present
or in the immediate future be profitably or reasonably
used without violation of the restriction. An ordinance
which permanently so restricts the use of property that
it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it
is plain, beyond regulation, and must be recognized as
a taking of the property. The only substantial differ-
ence, in such case, between restriction and actual tak-
ing, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to
the burden of payment of taxation, while outright con-
fiscation would relieve him of that burden."21
After reviewing the validity of an amendment to a
Zoning Ordinance in Maryland, the first problem we find is
the difference, if any, resulting from reclassification from
a higher to lower use (i.e., from Residential to Commercial)
or vice versa. Maryland's four leading cases on rezoning
seem to indicate that there is no distinction, with regard to
the effect on validity, between "rezoning up" and "rezoning
down".22 These cases furnish an excellent guide as to the
general state of the law in Maryland today regarding
rezoning.
-278 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. 2d 587, 117 A. L. R. 1110 (1938).-
0 Ibid, 591-2. This case has been cited in two recent Maryland decisions as
a leading authority, i.e., Northwest Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke, 191
Md. 171, 60 A. 2d 743 (1948) and the Kracke case being noted.
2 Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 18 A. 2d 856 (1941) ; North-
west Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke, supra, n. 21; Bruning Brothers, Inc.
v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 87 A. 2d 589 (Md., 1952) ; Kracke v. Weinberg,
79 A. 2d 387 (Md., 1951).
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Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club,23 was decided by the
Court of Appeals in 1941 and was the first of the "big four"
cases referred to above. Briefly it upheld the validity of a
rezoning ordinance changing a plot of land owned by and
adjoining the Pimlico Race track from residential to com-
mercial use, thereby permitting the track to build stables
thereon. In the course of his opinion, Judge Johnson stated:
"In order to impose restrictions some valid exercise of the
police power must be proven. But such power is invoked
for the protection of the property restricted and not to give
protection to surrounding property."24 Certain parts of his
opinion may suggest that such a reclassification from a
higher to lower use was a matter of right.25 However, a
careful scrutiny of this case in light of recent cases will
disclose an underlying principle not inconsistent with the
later cases. One statement of the Court is particularly use-
ful in reconciling this case with later cases. "This Court
has, therefore, recognized the right of the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore to change, modify and correct any
injustices found to exist under the original Zoning Ordi-
nance."2 In view of the factual finding in the later Bruning
Brothers27 case, decided by the Court of Appeals early in
1952, it is a distinct possibility that the Court of Appeals
could have based its favorable ruling as to the validity of
the rezoning ordinance in the Chayt case, on the ground
that the land was adjacent to a building being used as a non-
conforming use and hence rezoning would amount to a
mere continuation of such a use.
In Northwest Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke,2' a seg-
ment of land adjoining a railroad right-of-way was reclassi-
fied "upwards" from commercial to residential. In the rail-
road segment covered by the rezoning amendment, there
were no homes, and, the evidence indicated, there never
had been and probably never would be any. According to
testimony of expert witnesses houses could be built there,
"if you could get anyone foolish enough to do it"29 and any
construction for residential purposes would be a losing
venture. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the
- Supra, n. 22.
24 Ibid, 395.
See Kintner et al. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County,
Daily Record, June 26, 1952 (Cir. Ct. Balto. County, 1952).
" Supra, n. 22, 396; Italics added.





amendment was "unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to
Section 3 of the Zoning Enabling Act.""0
In the course of the opinion, Judge Markell cited exten-
sively from Judge Lehman's opinion in the Arverne Bay81
case and applied the logic of the "Due Process" clause of
the Federal Constitution to the facts in this case. The Court
stressed the fact that there was a strong presumption as to
the validity of the original zoning ordinance:
" 'When appellant passed the original ordinance its
powers were not exhausted. It could amend the ordi-
nance. But the power to amend was not arbitrary and
could not be exercised merely because someone wanted
it done or thought it ought to be done.... It could only
be exercised when the public good demanded or re-
quired that the amendment be made. When appellees
bought the land they had a right to rely upon the classi-
fication which existed at the time the purchase was
made. They also had a right to rely upon the rule of
law that the classification would not be changed unless
the change was required for the public good'. '32
In Bruning Bros., Inc., v. Mayor and City Council,33 a
question arose as to the validity of a rezoning ordinance
passed in 1942 putting plaintiff's 60 foot strip of land in a
higher use district (that is, from commercial to residential).
The constitutionality of the rezoning ordinance was at-
tacked on the grounds that the land so rezoned was in front
of a large paint-manufacturing plant (part of a non-con-
forming use built in 1944) and was suitable only for indus-
trial purposes. (Although the Court allowed the plaintiff
to use his land for industrial purposes on the ground of a
mere continuance of a non-conforming use) it held the re-
zoning ordinance valid, and set down two rules which
should be taken into consideration whenever the problem
of rezoning arises. First, it held that the rezoning ordinance
was valid because the "rezoning was in the nature of the
correction of an original error and was not a change in use
caused by new circumstances".34 This is in line with the
holding of the Chayt case cited earlier. 5 Secondly, because
the plaintiff had built the paint-manufacturing plant all
Ibid, 193.Supra, n. 20.
Supra, n. 21, 188, quoting Phipps v. Chicago, 339 Il. 315, 327, 171 N. E.
289, 293 (1930).
10 Supra, n. 22.
Ibid, 591.
- Supra, circa, n. 23.
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around his 60 foot plot making it virtually impossible to
use the lot in any other manner, the Court stressed the
holding of Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Assn., 6 and
observed that plaintiffs "could not claim they suffered a
peculiar hardship that entitled them to a special privilege,
where they themselves created the conditions which
brought about that situation." 7
The instant case 8 best ties in the three cases just cited
and gives us the firmest foundation on which to work out
some sort of pattern as to the validity of a rezoning ordi-
nance today in Maryland. We find that there is a strong
presumption that once land is zoned it is zoned correctly,
and will only be rezoned to correct an original error, or to
comply with a change in circumstances and uses of the
neighborhood to the extent that such action is necessary
to protect public health, safety and welfare. We also find
that the Courts will not sustain rezoning (or a refusal to
rezone) merely to set up (or maintain) arbitrary buffer
zones to protect residents outside of the area in contention.3 '
Along this line, the Maryland Court of Appeals is particu-
larly zealous in protecting a taxpayer's property when the
rezoning would deprive him of all reasonable use of the
land and thus amount to taking of property without due
process of law. From another approach, the Courts will not
tolerate the individual landowner's use of his own sur-
rounding land in such a manner as to depreciate his remain-
ing land to the point where it can't be used profitably as it
is then zoned.4"
Although at present the vast majority of litigation in-
volving the constitutionality of a rezoning ordinance has
come out of Baltimore City, the growing trend of the popu-
lation to move to the urban areas is likely t'o cause more
and more instances of zoning problems in the counties. Two
such cases were decided in Baltimore and Anne Arundel
Counties in 1952. In the case of Kintner, et al. v. Board
of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County,4 Judge Howard
Murray overruled the decision of the Board of Zoning
Appeals, thereby affirming the Zoning Commissioner of the
County who had refused a motion for reclassification of 122
acres from residential to commercial and lower residential.
-78 A. 2d 164 (Md., 1951).6 Supra, n. 22, 592.
MKracke v. Weinberg, supra, n. 22.
"See Northwest Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke, supra, n. 21 and cases
cited in n. 22, Supra.
tSee Bruning Bros., Inc. v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, supra, n. 22, and




The Board of Zoning Appeals gave no reasons for its action
in reclassifying, merely stating that such reclassification
would not jeopardize the public health, safety, welfare and
morals. Accordingly, Judge Murray held that such a rezon-
ing without any legal basis or justification falls into the
category of being arbitrary.
The Anne Arundel County case, Banner, et al. v. The
Home Sales Company, et al., 2 involved a slightly different
factual setup in that the amendments were made before
the original zoning plan was submitted for adoption. The
Court in upholding the zoning plan stressed the marked
difference between original zoning, where the presumption
is that the County Commissioners did not act unreasonably
and the ordinance is not discriminatory, and rezoning,
where a counter-presumption exists to the effect that the
original ordinance can only be changed because of error or
change in environment. The Court, by this decision did,
however, imply that any ruling by the Zoning Board should
not be too lightly considered.
In a comment appearing in part in the Real Estate Build-
ing News,4" Honorable F. Murray Benson, of the Baltimore
Bar, discussed the Kintner"' case and the Banner45 case in
light of zoning trends in Maryland. In commenting on the
Baltimore County case, the author indicated that any at-
tempts to have a rezoning amendment would need extensive
legal preparation.
"The court places great emphasis upon the type of
record that must be submitted in order to justify the
action of the Board of Zoning Appeals in the adoption
of the amendment. It is not enough that it be shown
that the sole objection raised against the rezoning was
on the part of surrounding property owners nor that
the Board found that these restrictions were not neces-
sary for the protection of the property involved in the
restriction or for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. The court has
almost said here that the welfare of adjoining residents
and the public welfare are synonymous. The amend-
ment is stricken down because it is not affirmatively
found to be necessary because of an error in the original
zoning and/or a change of conditions which make such
amendment necessary. There is a presumption of the
,2 Daily Record, June 30, 1952 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County, 1952).





correctness of the original regulation and there is no
counter-presumption in favor of the amendment. This
is tantamount to saying that the Board need not docu-
ment its original determination that the original zoniing
was in accordance with a comprehensive plan but that
it must document any resolution amending the original
zoning and argue affirmatively that it is made necessary
by one or the other of the reasons above cited."
Mr. Benson's comment, which the Real Estate Building
News could not publish in full, also contained the following
statement:
"This makes an application for rezoning in Balti-
more County a highly technical proceeding hardly to
be attempted by any citizen without the assistance of
able, legal and zoning counsel. The record must be
carefully prepared and the Board must be urged to
adopt a resolution in such form as that it will show
that it has made a determination upon evidence to be
set up in the resolution and has determined the neces-
sity by the application of guides and standards also set
forth in the resolution."
From the Banner8 case, Mr. Benson feels that the find-
ing of the Legislative Board will be given greater weight
and there would be less demand for extensive evidence to
be presented in the original Zoning Case. He says:
"In the comments of the court, there is evidence of
great respect for legislative .findings and the reluctance
of the court to disturb them except in cases where there
is unquestioned evidence of spot-zoning. This opinion
does not say that in a rezoning case the court will not
carefully scrutinize the findings of the Board of Zoning
Appeals. It does indicate that those findings will be
given greater weight by the court in view of the fact
that they are legislative and that the Board is presumed
to be better qualified to draw lines between the various
use districts than the court."
By way of conclusion, we find that, although the Court
of Appeals has ruled that a zoning ordinance will not be
changed except for original error or a change in the neigh-




whether or not the Courts will sustain a Zoning Authority's
opinion without supporting evidence.
Under ordinary circumstances, the Courts are inclined
to give great weight to the findings of an administrative
body and are reluctant to reverse them unless they are
clearly arbitrary. However, in view of the cases already
handed down by the Court of Appeals of Maryland stressing
the strong presumption that once land is zoned it can only
be rezoned to correct an original error or because of the
change in surroundings, I think it safe to predict that the
Court of Appeals will follow the leaning of Judge Murray's
decisions and require that the legislative board, in order
to justify a rezoning classification, must have concrete facts
and evidence presented before it which will sustain its
decision on appeal to the Courts, and that without such
evidence the Courts will be justified in overruling the
reclassification as being legally arbitrary. As a result, the
mere recitation alone by an administrative board that the
reclassification would not jeopardize the public health,
safety, welfare, and morals will not be sufficient evidence to
sustain the reclassification in the event of appeal to the
Courts, and it becomes extremely important for any attor-
ney seeking a rezoning classification to have all his evidence
prepared and presented to the administrative body.
MAY A MARRIED WOMAN SUE HER
HUSBAND BY SUBROGATION?
Gregg v. Gregg'
Appellant wife filed a bill in equity in Circuit Court
No. 2 of Baltimore City for permanent alimony, counsel
fees and reimbursement for sums expended by her for
necessaries. A demurrer to the bill was properly sustained,2
and on an amended bill, omitting the prayer for reimburse-
ment for necessaries, she was awarded permanent alimony
and counsel fees. Thereafter appellant brought this action
at law against her husband in the Baltimore City Court
seeking $2,500 which she claimed to have expended for
necessaries since her desertion by her husband, but before
her alimony suit was filed. Appellant wife claimed this sum
,Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 373, 45 A. 2d 73 (1945) ; Johnstown Coal and
Coke Co. v. Dishong, 84 A. 2d 847 (Md., 1951).
187 A. 2d 581 (1952).
Infra, n. 13.
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